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Since the annexation of Crimea, analysts have asked, ‘Is 
Narva next?’ The international media has descended on 
Narva to ask whether ‘little green men’ could suddenly 
appear there. An Estonian border town 150 km from St. 
Petersburg with an overwhelmingly Russian-speaking popu-
lation, Narva is a symbol for the larger Baltic question and 
the future of NATO. A chorus of prominent analysts and 
public figures, including former NATO Secretary General 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, have warned of the ‘high prob-
ability’ of future Russian action against the Baltic states.21 
Indeed, there is abundant evidence of increasing military 
activity in the Baltic Sea region as a spill-over from the 
Ukrainian crisis. Russian air force planes have been flying 
in a dangerous manner with their transponders switched 
off, and Russian warships have made their presence felt. In 
response, NATO has beefed up its air policing mission and 
increased troop deployment for exercises to reassure the 
Baltic states and deter Russia.
Although there might initially appear to be some su-
perficial similarities to the Ukrainian case, the differences 
are clearly more significant. First of all, the Baltic states are 
members of NATO and the EU, and Russian action against 
them would therefore have immeasurably graver conse-
quences.
The success of the Crimean operation depended on an 
element of surprise; few expected or planned for Ukraine 
to be attacked by Russia. The Russian preparations went 
undetected (or were at least not correctly understood). 
It was able to use its military bases already on Ukrainian 
territory, and top Ukrainian commanders defected to the 
Russian side. Russian actions exploited a unique post-revo-
lutionary situation with confusion regarding the legitimacy 
of the interim authorities in Kiev. The border with Russia in 
eastern Ukraine was lengthy, porous and weakly guarded. 
The fact that the Ukrainian forces did not open fire in 
Crimea encouraged Putin to believe that the same could 
be easily accomplished in eastern Ukraine. When Ukrainian 
forces resisted, however, they succeeded in winning back 
territory until Russian forces intervened directly.
In contrast to Ukraine, Estonia has the capacity to re-
spond quickly. Estonia is a well-governed state and one of 
the least corrupt in Europe. The country capitulated meekly 
to the USSR in 1940 in the vain hope of not provoking 
Moscow: the lesson drawn in the contemporary Estonian 
defence doctrine is always to offer military resistance. The 
Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces has stated that 
the first ‘little green man’ to appear on Estonian soil will be 
shot immediately.22
Hybrid war is nothing new for the Baltic states, which 
have already experienced elements of hybrid war, includ-
ing cyber-attacks, economic pressure and disinformation 
campaigns. Even the Soviet-sponsored, failed Communist 
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insurrection in 1924 had many common features with 
events in 2014, as did the Soviet annexation in 1940. A key 
feature of the Russian operations in Ukraine has been the 
denial of direct military involvement. Thus, the separatists 
claim to have obtained their Russian arms and equipment 
from overrun Ukrainian bases – which is impossible, since 
Estonian forces only use standard NATO equipment. Putin 
does not consider Ukraine to be a genuine nation, but 
rather a part of the larger Russian nation – Greater Russia 
(and many Russians agree with him). However, even Putin 
understands that Estonia, though small, is completely dis-
tinct – there is no historical dispute about Narva belonging 
to Estonia.
Perhaps the greatest concern has been caused not by 
the military but rather the ethnic factor. Putin has justified 
aggression against Ukraine with the need to ‘protect’ Rus-
sian-speakers. This is a dangerous fall-back to the pre-1945 
world, where dictators claimed the right to change borders 
by force to bring co-ethnics into their fold. Putin’s reason-
ing in Ukraine is a dramatic escalation from the spurious 
excuse, used six years earlier in South Ossetia, of protecting 
Russian citizens.
Russophones in Ukraine were swayed by the demonstra-
tion of power and rational calculations to side with the vic-
tor. Material considerations also played a role; for instance, 
pensions are higher in Russia than in Ukraine. Such incen-
tives do not apply in the Baltic case, where the standard of 
living is higher than in Russia. This is especially evident in 
the border areas, with the Pskov Oblast bordering Estonia 
and Latvia one of the poorest in the entire Russian Federa-
tion. People in Narva regularly cross the bridge to Ivangorod 
and are well aware of how life is more miserable on the 
Russian side of the border. Narva’s supermarkets became a 
popular destination for consumers from St. Petersburg after 
Putin slapped counter-sanctions on EU agricultural produce. 
Wages are lower and unemployment higher than in Tallinn, 
but Narva’s economic statistics are similar to those of other 
peripheral Estonian towns far from the capital.
While most Estonian Russophones support the annexa-
tion of Crimea, it would be wrong to jump to the conclu-
sion that they would desire similar Russian intervention at 
home. Indeed, the images of carnage in eastern Ukraine 
are a powerful argument in favour of maintaining peace. 
Rather than asking residents for their opinion about Crimea 
or Putin, it would be more insightful to ask whether they 
would prefer roubles to euros or the Russian healthcare sys-
tem to the Estonian one. Even Estonian Russophones who 
are non-citizens enjoy the right to freely travel and work 
within the EU, a privilege that would be sorely missed. 
Although there is a sharp contrast between Estonian and 
Russian-speakers in terms of their support for NATO and 
perceptions of a threat from Moscow, more importantly, 
there is little difference regarding the will to defend their 
country. 23 
It was previously believed that the integration of the 
Russian minority would be resolved over time – that Soviet 
nostalgia would fade with the passing of the older genera-
tion. The first warning signal that this assumption was false 
came with the conflict over the relocation of the Tallinn 
Soviet war monument (‘the Bronze soldier’) in 2007. Russia 
has used its ‘compatriots’ instrumentally in order to under-
mine societal integration and maintain a sense of griev-
ance and marginalization. The conflict in Ukraine has been 
accompanied by an unprecedented level and sophistication 
of hostile information warfare. Most Estonians and Russo-
phones live in separate information spaces, with Russian TV 
being the prime source for the latter. The Baltic states were 
among those who proposed that the EU take countermeas-
ures to combat Russian media falsifications. The Estonian 
government has decided to fund a new Russian language 
TV channel – not to provide counter-propaganda, but to 
strengthen the identity of the local community.
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Some analysts have argued that it is not important what 
people in Narva actually think, because Russia could ignite 
trouble simply by inserting a few outsiders. A related ques-
tion is whether NATO allies would be willing to ‘die for Nar-
va’? The logic of this hypothetical argument is that Putin’s 
ultimate aim is not territorial expansion, but rather dividing 
the West by undermining NATO and the EU. An opera-
tion limited to Narva could leave NATO with a dilemma in 
terms of how to respond, especially since Russian military 
policy envisages the ‘de-escalation’ of conflicts by nuclear 
means, i.e. threatening to carry out a limited tactical strike 
to convince NATO to refrain from coming to the assistance 
of an ally under attack. Andrei Piontkovsky has turned this 
question around, asking whether Putin is willing to die for 
Narva.24 Such a gamble would obviously involve high risks 
for Putin, but the Russian leader has demonstrated that he 
is much less risk-averse than Western leaders.
Visiting Tallinn in September 2014, U.S. President Obama 
stated that the ‘the defence of Tallinn and Riga and Vilnius 
is just as important as the defence of Berlin and Paris and 
London’.25 In order for the validity of this statement not to 
be tested, deterrent must be credible.
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